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INTRODUCTION
A glance at history is sufficient to see that analysis of economic policy under ‘peaceful’
circumstances is hardly satisfactory in explaining the behavior of governments, democratic or
otherwise. A country that faces a military threat will try to seek ways and measures to counter
it. These may range from efforts on the diplomatic front (say, joining a military defense pact)
to build up the necessary military potential to eliminate the threat (say, through developing a
pre-emptive strike capability). Inevitably, these efforts require some of the country’s resources
to be allocated for national defense purposes. In other words, the people of the country will be
asked to give up some of their current income, in exchange for an insurance against the prob-
ability of the realization of the military threat. It is clear that people will accept such a decision
(i.e. imposition of a tax to finance national defense expenditures) only if they feel such a threat
will adversely affect their well-being.
The purpose of this paper is to look at the problem of allocating resources between civilian
use and national defense under a military threat and the decision-making process behind it.
This problem is examined in a simple two-sector economy setting. The first sector is identified
as producing an all-purpose commodity. It is produced by the private sector and this commod-
ity can be used for consumption and investment purposes as well as the physical input in the
production of the national defense good. The public sector, on the other hand, is solely
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engaged in the production of a public good, namely, the national defense service. It is assumed
that, since issues pertaining to the national defense service require high level specialization
and technical competency, all decisions related to its production and supply are delegated to a
special agency (i.e. the military authority). The economic policy problem that the government
is facing is, then, finding an optimal growth path for this economy by appropriately allocating
resources between private and public use.
The paper is organized as follows. In the following section the main features of the economy
in question are examined. The third section is devoted to the description of the demand and
supply of the national defense service, which is treated as a public good. In the fourth section,
the government’s economic policy problem is formulated in finding the optimal growth path
of the economy in question, under a given military threat. The fifth section is an attempt to
offer a logical explanation for the likely diverging views of the government and the military
authority on the issue of allocating resources to national defense. The paper concludes with
the discussion of the importance of mutual trust and cooperation between the government and
the military authority.
A SIMPLE TWO SECTOR ECONOMY: MAIN FEATURES
The following assumptions are presumed to hold in the economy in question.
(1) A single all-purpose commodity is produced by the private sector in a perfectly competi-
tive environment. All investment is carried out by the private sector only to enhance
commodity production capacity.
(2) The public sector is solely focused on supplying a single public good, namely ‘national
defense’. The national defense expenditures are financed by taxes. The budget is always
balanced.
(3) The economic policy problem of the government is to maximize the inter-temporal social
welfare function, which is assumed to depend on per capita consumption.
(4) The investment decisions of private agents (firms, households) are sensitive to the secu-
rity level that the country achieved. An unsatisfactory security level induces capital flight
(i.e. private agents prefer to invest abroad).
(5) The current account of the balance of payments is always balanced.
Under these assumptions the economy in question can be characterized as follows:
The national income identity is: 
(1)
where Y-national income; Cp-consumption expenditures of those that work in the private
sector; I-investment (all investment is assumed to be undertaken by the private sector in Y
good production); G-public expenditure, Fp-capital flight (investment abroad).
Public expenditures, G, consist only of expenditures related to national defense. Under this
heading, two types of expenditures can be distinguished. The first is the salaries paid to the
military personnel, Wg, and the second is the expenditures for procuring military equipment
and for operations and maintenance, Gm. 
(2)
Suppose that the production function for the private good is of the Cobb–Douglas type: 
(3)
Y C I G Fp p= + + +
G W Gg m= +
Y K L= −α α α ε1 0 1( , )
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where K is the capital stock and the Lp is the labor (assumed to be homogeneous) employed
in the production of the private good Y. Since perfect competition assumption is made, all
factors of production are paid according to the value of their marginal products: 
(4)
where wp is the wage rate in private good production and r is the rate of return on capital. It
is further assumed that the same wage rate also applies to the military personnel, Lg.1 Under
these assumptions, the amount of tax revenue, T, needed to finance national defense expendi-
tures, can be written as: 
(5)
Levying such a tax, obviously, requires public approval (say through voting in the parlia-
ment).
Total consumption, C, is the sum of the consumption of the privately employed, Cp, and the
consumption of the military personnel, Cg. Let us denote it by C and assume that the aggregate
consumption function for this economy is a linear function of the aggregate disposable
income: 
(6)
From equations (5) and (6), under balanced current account and budget assumptions, total
savings for this economy can be expressed as: 
(7)
The last entity in the national income identity is investment, Ip. In this economy all invest-
ment is assumed to be undertaken by the private agents to inject capital in to the production of
private good, Y. Capital is assumed to depreciate at an instantaneous rate δ. Therefore: 
(8)
THE DEMAND FOR NATIONAL SECURITY GOOD AND ITS SUPPLY
How much a country demands national security good (service), Z, depends on the intensity of
the threat that the country is perceived to be subjected to and the size of the country. Suppose
that the population of the country is used as a proxy for its size. Let L denote the total popula-
tion of the country, which is assumed to grow at a constant rate n (i.e. unknown/L = n). Then, the
demand for national defense good can be expressed as a function of the level of the perceived
threat, γ, and the size of the population of the country, L: 
1 It is assumed that L = Lp + Lg.
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(9)
Let us assume that Zd can be written in the following decomposable form: 
(10)
Suppose that the perceived threat level, ξ, is fixed. Then the first expression on the right-
hand side can be written as: 
(11)
The public good characteristic of the national defense good is introduced into this frame-
work by setting its elasticity of demand with respect to the size of the population ν < 1.2 In
other words: 
(12)
Under these assumptions the demand for national defense service to counter a given threat
is obtained by inserting equations (11) and (12) into (10) as: 
(13)
In order to characterize the national defense good production, it is assumed that the armed
forces’ organization is based on its weapons arsenal. Since each weapon needs a strictly
defined crew to operate it, the personnel requirements of the armed forces can be derived from
its weapons’ profiles. In other words, the national defense good is assumed to be produced by
a Leontief-type fixed coefficient production function: 
(14)
where θ and β are the output to physical input3 and labor coefficients, respectively. Assum-
2 Notice that when v = 0, the size of the population does not affect the national defense requirements. This is pure
public good case. On the other hand, v = 1 corresponds to pure private good case, where need for national defense
service is a linear function of the size of the population. In fact the v < 1 case corresponds to what is referred to as
social infrastructure in Chin (2002). The assumption v < 1 implies that an increase in the size of the economy
(measured say by its population) requires a higher (but not proportionally) military force. For example suppose a city
with a population of 750,000 can effectively be defended against air strikes by three surface-to-air guided missile
batteries. The same air defense system may still be sufficient when the population of the city increases to 1 million
and one more battery may be needed when the population is between 1 and 2 million.
3 There are two issues to be discussed concerning this formulation of the production technology for the national
defense good. The first is related to the malleability of the single all-purpose commodity. It is assumed that it can
take any shape, including various types of weapons. This assumption makes it possible to aggregate the weapons
arsenal of the armed forces under a single physical input category. The military personnel, like the labor force in the
private sector, is assumed to be homogeneous.
The second issue is the treatment of capital input in the production function for the national defense good. The
formulation given in equation (14) is based on a circulating capital model. In other words, physical inputs are
assumed to wear/tear in one production period, which does not correspond to the reality in many instances. Many
weapon platforms (bombers, warships etc) have quite long operational life to be considered as circulating capital
inputs. For example, the Boeing B-52 jet bomber entered USAF service in 1952 and is still operational in 2003. A
similar example can be given from the Soviet Union. The Tupolev Tu-95 turbo-prop bomber entered the Soviet Air
Force service in 1956 and is still operational in 2003. Long enduring warships are not uncommon. HMS Vengeance
joined the Royal Navy in 1945. It was still operational in 2002 in the Brazilian Navy as Minas Gerais. Finally the
Chrysler (later became General Dynamics Land Systems) M-60 MBT, which entered the US Army arsenal in 1960,
is still operational in many armies of the world, including Israel and Turkey, and some are kept in Reserve and Army
National Guard Units in the USA.
One way of interpreting the circulating capital t reatmen t of weap ons is to assume that such long enduring weapon platforms are e i ther leased  or the portion of Gm  allocated  to su ch weapons  refers  only  to the instal lment  pay ments  fo r their acquisit ion.It should  also b  ointed out  that the operational l ife of a weapon platform can be ex ended effe c tively only by the cont inuous intro duction  of modifications required by  the ad van ces in the military techn ology.  A seco d interpre ati n for u sing  the circulat ing capital  mod el  in national defense g ood produ ction is based on this ob servat ion by  introdu cing two assump tions . The first assu mption is that the weapon platforms are infinitely enduring. However, due to rapidadvance in mili tary  ech n log y, mo difi t ions  are required to extend  their opera ion al  life.Going back t  he example given bove, the most  success u l long-range bomb rs of the avia tion histor , th B -52 and Tu-95 were m odified almost  co n n uously during their perat ion l l ifet ime. In fa t , eig t v ari nts f B-52 and n ine vers ions  of Tu-95 entered the serv ice of th eir respectiv e air forces, and they were als  s imultaneously upgraded. For more information ee Gunston & Gil christ  (1 993, pp.  87–102 ) and B ugher (1 998) for B-52 and Gu nston (1995, pp.42 4–427) for Tu-9 5 .
Z Z Ld d= ( , )ϒ
Z L Z Z Ld d d= ×( , ) ( ) ( )ϒ ϒ1 2
Z d1 ( )ϒ = ξ
Z L L vd v2 0 1( ) ( , )= ε
Z L Ld v( , )ϒ = ξ
Z G Ls m g=  min ,θ β
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ing efficiency in the national defense good production, its supply can be expressed as a linear
function of the active military personnel as4 
(15)
It is clear that under ideal conditions, the government is expected to satisfy the demand for
national defense fully. However, in reality there may be some discrepancies. At a given level
of threat, excess demand for national defense good 
(16)
may or may not be zero. If national defense is a matter of concern for the people living in
the country in question, then the sign as well as the magnitude of the excess demand for
national defense good can be expected to influence their behavior. Simply by looking at the
excess demand for national defense good three cases can be distinguished:
(i) E(Z) = 0. The supply of national defense good matches the demand, and therefore the
desired security level can be assumed to be reached. Under these conditions people can
be expected to behave as if there is no threat.
(ii) E(Z) < 0. There is an oversupply of national defense good. This may either be due to waste
or excessive military build-up aimed for another purpose than national defense. In this
case, people may either be concerned about the efficiency in the public sector or the possi-
bility of an aggressive policy pursued by their government.
(iii) E(Z) > 0. There is excess demand for national defense good. In this case, people of the
country may have concerns about their security. From an economic point of view this is
the interesting case, since the degree of insecurity that the people feel can be expected to
reflect itself on to their economic decisions.
In order to explore the last case in the simple framework of this paper, let us define the
following variable: 
(17)
It is clear that σ(Z) ∈ [0, 1]. The calculation of σ requires specific information concerning
the military technology chosen, β; the level of military threat, ξ; and the number of the military
personnel, Lg. It is reasonable to assume that only the military authority is endowed with such
information and the technical capability to process it. Private agents, on the other hand, are
4 For the sake of simplicity, it is assumed that, referring one of the input coefficients is sufficient to identify a
military technology. In the remainder of this paper, the output/labor ratio, β, will be used for this purpose.
One way of interpreting the circulating capital treatment of weapons is to assume that such long enduring weapon
platforms are either leased or the portion of Gm allocated to such weapons refers only to the installment payments for
their acquisition.
It should also be pointed out that the operational life of a weapon platform can be extended effectively only by the
continuous introduction of modifications required by the advances in the military technology. A second interpreta-
tion for using the circulating capital model in national defense good production is based on this observation by intro-
ducing two assumptions. The first assumption is that the weapon platforms are infinitely enduring. However, due to
rapid advance in military technology, modifications are required to extend their operational life.
Going back to the example given above, the most successful long-range bombers of the aviation history, the B-52
and Tu-95 were modified almost continuously during their operational lifetime. In fact, eight variants of B-52 and
nine versions of Tu-95 entered the service of their respective air forces, and they were also simultaneously upgraded.
For more information see Gunston & Gilchrist (1993, pp. 87–102) and Baugher (1998) for B-52 and Gunston (1995,
pp. 424–427) for Tu-95.
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assumed to lack such knowledge on rather technical military issues. Therefore, they can, at
most, be expected to have some assessment of the level of national security that the country is
enjoying. Suppose that their assessment can be translated into an estimate of σ, say unknown .5 On
the other hand, private agents will take this information into account in their major economic
decisions.
Let: 
(18)
where ξ is the ‘security threshold’ (i.e. the level of security that is considered satisfactory
by the people of the country). Suppose that when the security level is below the threshold level,
people get worried and curb their investments and capital flight occurs. A rather simple way
of incorporating this phenomenon into the analysis is introducing an investment function of
the following form: 
(19)
This investment function indicates that capital flight occurs if and only if the excess demand
for national defense is positive (i.e. Fp > 0 ⇔ E(Z) > 0).
The level of security threshold, ξ, has little, if any, meaning for a military decision-maker.
The military authority is given the task of taking the necessary measures to counter the threat
fully and, therefore, has the responsibility to base its decisions on its technical evaluation. The
ignorance of the public does not play any role in the military decision-making. However, for
the political authority, the threshold level is important, since it marks the point where the
economic behavior of the private agents changes. For example, for the government it may not
make sense (i.e. it may not be ‘economical’) to increase national defense expenditures beyond
the threshold level.
THE GOVERNMENT’S ECONOMIC POLICY PROBLEM: FINDING THE 
OPTIMAL GROWTH PATH UNDER THREAT
Suppose that the government’s economic policy objective is to find the optimal growth path
for this economy, by taking into account the need to allocate some resources to national
defense. For this purpose, suppose that the social welfare of the society is approximated by the
per capita consumption and is given by the following inter-temporal social welfare function: 
(20)
where c is the per capita consumption, ρ is the subjective rate of time preference of the
society, and u(c) = ln(c) is the instantaneous utility function.6
5 For the sake of simplicity here, the government’s ignorance level is assumed to be the same as that of the public.
In fact, one can expect governments to be more knowledgeable on military issues than the private agents, but not as
much as the military authority.
6 This is a special case of constant-relative-risk-aversion utility functions. For In the relative-risk-aversion coeffi-
cient is 1, see Romer (1996, p. 40).
σˆ
η σ σ σ ζ
σ ζ
( ˆ) ˆ ˆ
ˆ
= ≤ <
= >
1
1
I Y C Y Y
L
L Gp
P
g m= −  = − + +






η η γ γ( (ˆ ) ˆ ) ( )T 1σσ - ∂∂
W c u c dt c dtp n t p n t( ) ( ) ln( )( ) ( )= =− −∞ − −∞∫ ∫e e0 0
OPTIONAL GROWTH UNDER MILITARY THREAT 139
Let the share of military personnel in the total labor force be defined as: 
(21)
Since the production function for the national defense good is of Leontief type, when mili-
tary technology is given, under efficiency in production assumption, µg will also determine the
physical input requirements for the national defense good production: 
(22)
Therefore µg can be considered as a proxy for military strength.
Let us denote the other relevant per capita variables as: 
(23)
Since 
(24)
the following expressions can be derived: 
(25)
(26)
and 
(27)
Using equations (17), (21), (26) and (27), and assuming that the η( unknown ) is known,7 the govern-
ment’s economic policy problem can be formulated as an optimal control problem as follows: 
(28)
7 This assumption implies that the government is able to gather reliable information concerning unknown  and ζ.
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In this problem, the control variable of the government is µg; the ratio of military personnel
to total labor force. The state variable is k; the aggregate capital/labor ratio.8
Let 
(29)
be the optimal solution of the economic policy problem given in equation (28). Then the
resources allocated to national defense, in per capita terms, will be: 
(30)
ALLOCATING RESOURCES FOR NATIONAL DEFENCE: ECONOMIC AND
MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS
The implementation of the solution of the economic policy problem given in equation (28)
obviously requires information sharing and cooperation between the economic policy making
body and the military authority, and also the consent of the public (for example through the
approval of the budget by parliament). In fact, the rules for such cooperation are devised in all
countries that have budgetary procedures. The military authority determines the military tech-
nology, β, and presents its budget proposal, unknown g, to the government. The government, then, uses
this information to solve its economic policy problem.
If |unknown g − unknown g| < ε for an arbitrarily small ε > 0, then the military authority’s budget proposal
can be considered to coincide with the optimal solution of the government’s economic policy
problem. However, such an outcome is highly unlikely. The differences in the responsibilities
of the government and the military authority compel them to consider the allocation of
resources for the national defense problem from different angles. It is, therefore, natural for
these two bodies to have some divergence on this issue.
Consider the problem examined in the previous section. There, the government’s purpose
is to maximize welfare of the society. In this context, allocating resources to national defense
is a necessity, since insufficient national security creates an unsuitable environment for invest-
ment and, therefore, adversely affects the growth performance of the economy. However, for
the military authority the problem is different. The military authority’s problem is to take all
the necessary measures to counter the military threat. For the military authority, the economic
consequences of such a decision is, at least, secondary. Once the differences in the tasks of the
government and the military authority are taken into account, the military authority’s budget
proposal can hardly be expected to coincide with what is optimal for the government from an
8 The problem depicted in equation (28) is the well-known Cass–Koopmans approach to finding an optimal
growth path in a one-sector economy. See Chiang (1993, pp. 253–263) for a brief discussion.
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economic policy point of view. Therefore, it is not a surprise to observe a disagreement over
the national defense budget between governments and military authorities, when both do their
jobs properly. The question, then, becomes making a choice between the proposal of a less
knowledgeable principal (the government) and that of a more knowledgeable agent (the mili-
tary authority) or finding a compromise. Reconciliation of these two, possibly conflicting,
views requires effort from both parties towards understanding each other’s concerns and the
logic behind the arguments put forward.
In order to elaborate the points raised above, let us return to the simple framework devel-
oped in the previous section. The model presented there has three issues on which these two
decision making bodies should come to an agreement. These are identification of the level of
the military threat, ξ; choice of military technology, β; and determination of the military
strength, µg.
Assessing the military threat, ξ, requires the evaluation of issues ranging from the military
capabilities of the probable adversaries to their intentions. Therefore, determining the effective
level of threat is a multi-criteria decision problem that can be approached in many different
ways, so presenting diverging conclusions. This may indeed be one of the sources of the poten-
tial differences between governments and military authorities, as they approach the same prob-
lem from different viewpoints. For example, a well-functioning military authority may
attribute more weight to the military capability of the potential source of threat than the polit-
ical authority does, and less to the effectiveness of the international agreements in preventing
the realization of such threat. The reverse may hold for the government.9 In order to simplify
the problem at hand, henceforth it will be assumed that the government and the military
authority are in full agreement on the level of the military threat, ξ. For the remaining issues
let us look at the military authority’s problem, which is and should be, different from that of
the government’s.
The military authority’s sole concern is to counter the military threat, to its possible full
extent. Therefore, its objective function is to minimize the excess demand for national secu-
rity. The military authority can achieve this objective by choosing the most appropriate mili-
tary technology, unkown  (the control variable), and securing the necessary amount of resource, unkown ,
(the state variable). The military authority’s problem, therefore, can be expressed as follows: 
(31)
where B is the set of available military technologies. The equation of motion for the state
variable indicates that, at any point in time, the change in the resource requirements for
national defense depends on the military technology chosen and on the resources already allo-
cated for this purpose. The military authority, thus, determines its choice of military technol-
ogy and its resource requirements over time to counter optimally the perceived military threat
(i.e. (unknown , unknown g)).10
9 One may also expect the military authority to have an upward bias in assessing the threat (i.e. placing more
emphasis on the worst case scenario). On the other hand, the government may tend to exaggerate the political conse-
quences of allocating less resource to civilian use.
10 Since the objective function and the constraints of the problem are not explicitly stated in equation (28), this
formulation pictures a less transparent environment than the government has in making its economic policy decision.
This is assumed to reflect the secrecy related to national defense issues.
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It is clear from equations (28) and (31) that the government and the military authority have
different objective functions as well as different constraint and information sets. Therefore, it
is natural for these two decision-making bodies to end up with different conclusions concern-
ing the resources to be allocated for national defense. In particular, in contrast to the govern-
ment, the military authority’s solution does not take into account economic variables. The
problem as posed in equation (31) is purely in military-technological terms.
In addition, governments cannot be fully knowledgeable on the deep and complex field of
military technology.11 Therefore, in most instances, the disagreements between governments
and the military authorities over the military budget can be expected to stem from economic
considerations. In order to see the implications of the differences between the government and
the military authority, let us concentrate on the budget making process:
(1) The process starts with the military authority’s request for resources, derived from the
solution of equation (31), (unknown , unknown g).
(2) The government takes unknown  as given and solves the problem given in equation (28) to find
the optimal resource allocation rule, unknown g.
(3) The disagreement arises only if unknown g > unkown g, i.e. when the resource demands of the military
authority exceeds the budget that is consistent with the optimal growth path of the
economy.
When unknown g > unknown g, the government has two options. The first is to ask the military authority to
revise its proposal in order to squeeze into the limits of the government’s budget. In this case,
the military authority is expected to make the cuts in its resource needs and, if it is deemed
necessary, modify its military technology proposal, unknown . In the latter case, the government will
be in a position of solving its economic policy decision problem once more, as unkown  is one of the
parameters in equation (28).12
11 There are instances in which governments forget their informational disadvantages and take drastic decisions
concerning specific weapons systems. In the history of military aviation, for example, one such wrong decision is not
forgotten. On 4 April 1958, then the ruling British Conservative Government issued the notorious White Paper, the
so-called Duncan Sandys Report, named after the Minister of Defense. In this report, it was claimed that the future
defense policy of Great Britain will be based on the concept of nuclear deterrence and declared that the strike and
defense capability will be left to ground-launched guided missiles. This decision, which effectively stopped all work
on the military manned aircraft (with few exception), not only turned out to be wrong for the British Armed Forces,
but also resulted in disastrous consequences for the British aviation industry.
12 Occasionally, but not very infrequently, governments go beyond this framework and they themselves limit or
cancel procurements of certain weapons (i.e. de facto, change the military technology proposed by the military
authorities). The following examples indicate that such governmental interventions are neither rare nor confined to
democratic societies.
(i) In February 1949, the MD-450 Ouragan jet fighter made its first flight. The French Air Force wanted to
acquire 850 Ouragans. In 2 August 1950, however, the French government reduced the order to 150.
(ii) In the first half of the 1950s, the Soviet Navy planned to acquire 110 Project 56 (Kotlin) class destroyers.
Only 27 of them were acquired.
(iii) In 1976, the USAF was prepared to acquire 240 B-1A bombers. However, on 30 June 1977, President Carter
terminated the project to procure B-1A bombers.
(iv) In 1980, Israel launched the IAI-Lavi multi-role combat aircraft project. The prospective IDF/AF require-
ment was 300 aircraft. IAI-Lavi made its first flight on 31 December 1986. However, on 30 August 1987
the project was terminated on budgetary considerations.
(v) In 1985, the Soviet Air Force made a request for 100 Tu-160 (Blackjack) long range supersonic bombers.
Although the authorization was made, the production was terminated, in 1992, after the completion of the
36th aircraft. In fact, as a result of severe budget cuts, the Russian Air Force was able to acquire only 25 of
them.
(vi) In 1990s, the USAF, planned to procure 133 B-2A Spirit stealth bombers. However, due to budget
constraints, only 21 of these planes were acquired.
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CONCLUSIONS
The preceding discussion reveals that allocating resources optimally between civilian use and
national defense purposes is neither a pure economic decision problem nor it can be left to the
discretion of the military authorities.13 The government, being the less knowledgeable in mili-
tary issues, may not fully appreciate the resource requirements for national defense. Therefore,
it is more susceptible to committing mistakes that may endanger the national security of the
country, if it acts alone. On the other hand, military authorities are well endowed with such
information, but they are not in the position of evaluating the economic results of allocating
resources between private use and national defense. Therefore, their resource demands to
attain a national security level according to their standards may unnecessarily curb the
resources available for private use and hinder the growth prospects of the country.
A Mutual trust and cooperation between the government and the military authority may
make it easier and less costly for the country to find the optimal allocation of its resources
between civilian and military use. Using the terminology of this paper, the government is
assumed to be relatively more knowledgeable about the preferences of the public and is also
more sensitive to their reaction. In particular, the government is assumed to be able to estimate
accurately the private sector’s response to the changes in the national security level, η,
whereas the military authority is better qualified to measure the relative excess demand for
national defense, σ. Under the mutual trust assumption, the government will take the military
authority’s proposal, (unknown , unknown g), as a starting point and instead of searching for the optimal value
of µ in the [0,1] interval, it may confine itself to the vicinity of unknown g, say its δ-neighborhood,
where δ > 0 but is reasonably small. This will shorten the search period for the government.
In return, the military authority will be more inclined to attribute budget cuts to the economic
constraints that the government is facing and not to its ignorance on national defense issues.
Although the cooperation of the government and the military authority in achieving an opti-
mal allocation of resources between civilian and military use is necessary, it can hardly be
considered sufficient. From equation (5) it is clear that the taxpayers have the last word. They
need to be convinced. This is the responsibility of the political authority. The government
should be accountable to the public for its assessment of the threat and its decision to allocate
funds to counter this threat. It goes without saying that the transparency of the military expen-
ditures is an indispensable requirement for government in fulfilling this obligation.
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